Download PDF The Back Channel A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal William J Burns 9780525508861 Books
Download As PDF : The Back Channel A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal William J Burns 9780525508861 Books
“Bill Burns is a treasure of American diplomacy.”—Hillary Clinton
“The Back Channel shows how diplomacy works, why it matters, and why its recent demise is so tragic.”—Walter Isaacson, author of Leonardo da Vinci
Over the course of more than three decades as an American diplomat, William J. Burns played a central role in the most consequential diplomatic episodes of his time—from the bloodless end of the Cold War to the collapse of post–Cold War relations with Putin’s Russia, from post–9/11 tumult in the Middle East to the secret nuclear talks with Iran.
In The Back Channel, Burns recounts, with novelistic detail and incisive analysis, some of the seminal moments of his career. Drawing on a trove of newly declassified cables and memos, he gives readers a rare inside look at American diplomacy in action. His dispatches from war-torn Chechnya and Qaddafi’s bizarre camp in the Libyan desert and his warnings of the “Perfect Storm” that would be unleashed by the Iraq War will reshape our understanding of history—and inform the policy debates of the future. Burns sketches the contours of effective American leadership in a world that resembles neither the zero-sum Cold War contest of his early years as a diplomat nor the “unipolar moment” of American primacy that followed.
Ultimately, The Back Channel is an eloquent, deeply informed, and timely story of a life spent in service of American interests abroad. It is also a powerful reminder, in a time of great turmoil, of the enduring importance of diplomacy.
Advance praise for The Back Channel
“Bill Burns is simply one of the finest U.S. diplomats of the last half century. The Back Channel demonstrates his rare and precious combination of strategic insight and policy action. It is full of riveting historical detail but also, more important, shrewd insights into how we can advance our interests and values in a world where U.S. leadership remains the linchpin of international order.”—James A. Baker III
“From one of America’s consummate diplomats, The Back Channel is an incisive and sorely needed case for the revitalization of diplomacy—what Burns wisely describes as our ‘tool of first resort.’”—Henry Kissinger
“Burns not only offers a vivid account of how American diplomacy works, he also puts forward a compelling vision for its future that will surely inspire new generations to follow his incredible example.”—Madeleine K. Albright
Download PDF The Back Channel A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal William J Burns 9780525508861 Books
"The back channel is a first person accounting by Burns, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and career Foreign Service officer of the highs and lows of American foreign policy and diplomacy in recent decades. In short, it provides a strong defense of American diplomacy and the need for negotiation in a non–zero-sum world. The stories are fascinating, delving into issues relating to numerous foreign powers, and particularly Russia.
In all, it provides a great insight, and a valuable lesson, regarding the importance of foreign diplomacy in an ever more interconnected world."
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The Back Channel A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal William J Burns 9780525508861 Books Reviews :
The Back Channel A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal William J Burns 9780525508861 Books Reviews
- The back channel is a first person accounting by Burns, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and career Foreign Service officer of the highs and lows of American foreign policy and diplomacy in recent decades. In short, it provides a strong defense of American diplomacy and the need for negotiation in a non–zero-sum world. The stories are fascinating, delving into issues relating to numerous foreign powers, and particularly Russia.
In all, it provides a great insight, and a valuable lesson, regarding the importance of foreign diplomacy in an ever more interconnected world. - Throughout the “The Back Channel†Author William J. Burns gives the reader an incredible front row seat to the last thirty plus years of American diplomacy (or sometimes the lack of diplomacy!) Through the author’s respectful and thought-provoking critique of the past 5 presidential administrations we are able to see where our foreign policy has served us well and where it has failed. The author does an amazing job of sifting through his years of service focusing on critical events and policies that give context to not only where we have been and where we are, but even more importantly what the future could be! While politically there were policies I opposed, I closed the book with an incredible respect and appreciation for the hard work, intelligence, and agility that goes into achieving a coherent and credible foreign policy. I couldn’t help but think how lucky our country had been to have the service of William Burns. And despite the incredibly challenging times before us, after reading “The Back Channelâ€, I am left with the belief that there will be others following William Burns that are ready to dedicate themselves to developing and implementing a coherent foreign policy/diplomacy that recognizes our values, respects the values of others and can still give hope to the world. And even more importantly upon finishing the book, I am left knowing that while changes may be necessary to reflect the dynamics of a new world, it is critical that the work of diplomacy not only continue but be made a priority for our country! I was honored to receive a free advanced copy of this book from NetGalley and the Publisher, Random House in exchange for an honest review.
- This is the best diplomatic memoir I have ever read. Informed, illuminating day-to-day events with amazing candor, including remarkably honest recognition of what the author (Burns) felt to be personal mistakes as well as those carried out by the State Department.
There were many confirmatory revelations for me.
The poorly considered and destructive impact of the expansion of NATO, the “killer†being the suggested expansion of the EU and likely then NATO to the Ukraine and Georgia. Putin and Russian’s of all stripes made it clear that this was a red line that could not be crossed.
Burns was in Moscow in 1995. He writes that Talbot as well as Secretary of Defense Bill Perry worried that starting down the road to form an enlargement of NATO would undermine hopes for a more enduring partnership with Russia undercutting reformers who would see it as a vote of no confidence in their efforts, a hedge against the likely failure of reform. “We shared similar concerns at Embassy Moscow. The challenge for us,†Burns wrote, in fall 1995, “is to look past the parent government of Russia’s often irritating rhetoric and the erratic and reactive diplomacy to our own long-term self interest. That demands, in particular, that we continue to seek to build a secure order in Europe sufficiently in Russia’s interests so that a revived Russia will have no compelling reason to revise it—and so that in the meantime the ‘stab in the back’ theorists will have only limited room for maneuver in Russian politics.†Sadly, we did not follow this advice.
For a time, we pursued the “Partnership for Peace,†a kind of NATO halfway house, but we did not pursue it aggressively, nor did Russia.
Putin’s increasing inclination to see a plot against him and Russia from almost every event, including protests about his decision to continue as president, is made abundantly clear.
Burns rightly describes Putin’s (and many Russians) intent as he writes “often as preoccupied with their sense of exceptionalism as Americans were, they sought a distinctive political and economic system, which would safeguard the individual freedoms and economic possibilities denied them under Communism, and ensure them a place among the handful of world powers.â€
Burns continues with these personal words that I would echo “I like Russians, respected their culture, enjoy their language and was endlessly fascinated by the tangled history of U.S.-Russian diplomacy.â€
The history of our invidious inclination to pursue regime change is honestly described. Starting with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Iraq which Burns and most of the State Department vigorously opposed, including the war that precipitated it. He sadly writes “Having lost the argument to avoid war, we had two main goals in shaping it and managing the inevitable risks.†They were going about “choosing between a smart way and a dumb way of bringing it (the regime change) about.†The Pentagon had taken over leadership from the State Department, together with Vice President Cheney.
The regime change went on in Libya with the overthrow of Kaddafi, not intended, but likely inevitable with the actions we took. A slippery slope it turned out to be.
Then we went on, through phone calls from Obama, telling Mubarak to step down in Egypt.
Elsewhere, Burns writes about his growing recognition of “the quality and increasing self-confidence of Chinese diplomacy.†That does not surprise me. It is exactly how I felt about Chinese leadership in the government and in business.
Burns tells the story of the negotiations which led to the anti-nuclear proliferation treaty with Iran in great detail. It was an extraordinary journey. Not perfect in the outcome, as Burns described it. They should have pushed for a longer period. But the best that could be obtained. This saga makes me doubly sorry that Trump had pulled out of it. What a hit to our credibility.
Burns is brutally honest in his assessment of how he sees the state department needing to change in the future. He confesses to its being too “cautious, reactive and detached,†too bureaucratic, not effectively tied to the Hill, not adequately conveying the importance of diplomacy to the American public through illumination of the specific accomplishments it has enabled.
He advocates greater “candor and transparency (in describing)†the purpose and limits of American engagement abroad. “It is more effective to level with the American people about the challenges we face and the choices we make than to wrap them in the tattered robe of untampered exceptionalism or fan fears of external threats. Over promising and under delivery is the surest way to undermine the case for American diplomacy.â€
Or anything else for that matter.
He advocates the importance of aligning our policies with “ensuring that the American middle class is positioned as well as possible for success in a hyper competitive world, that we build open and equitable trading systems, and that we don’t shy away from holding to account those who do not play by the rules of the game.â€
I applaud his summation of our relationship with Russia. “A more durable 21st century European security architecture has alluded us in nearly three decades of fitful attempts to engage post-Cold War Russia that is not likely to change any time soon—certainly not during Putin’s tenure. Ours should be a long game strategy, not giving into Putin’s aggressive score settling, but not giving up on the possibility of an eventual mellowing of relations beyond him, nor can we afford to ignore the need for guardrails in managing an often adversarial relationship—sustaining communication between our militaries and our diplomats, and preserving what we can of a collapsing arms control architecture.â€
I believe very much in what he wrote next. “Over time, Russia’s stake in healthy relations with Europe and Americana may grow, as a slow-motion collision with China and Central Asia looms.â€
Burns’ book shares a lot of sad tales. Beyond those I have already mentioned, there is the dispirited description of the efforts to bring the Palestinians and Israelis together. Once again, Burns and most of the state department saw our policies which favored Israel and demoted the interests of Palestine as making the creation of a two-state solution unlikely to impossible. And it has proved that. More so today than ever with Netanyahu having achieved a fourth term.
Here is a question which looms large to me in reading this memoir which Burns touches on but does not address directly why were the State Department and its leaders unable to play a stronger role in making happen what they thought should happen.
To be sure, the outcomes were not totally bleak. While it has been unwound by the U.S, (but not the other signatories), the Iranian treaty was a diplomatic victory. So was the Paris Climate Treaty and, while he doesn’t talk about it at length, I’d imagine the Trans-Pacific Partnership was another. Tragically, all three of these accomplishments have been dismissed by the Trump administration. However, on other truly crucial events, the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of NATO with its impact on U.S.-Russia relations, Libya (though the state department as split on this), and Egypt, the beliefs of our most trained, experienced diplomats failed to carry the day.
One thing for sure. This argues for an extraordinarily strong Secretary of State. We had that in Jim Baker.
And that Secretary of State has to be respected by and aligned with the President. Again, we had that with Jim Baker and George H.W. Bush
